Subject to Change

Steve at No Runny Eggs has a scary story about the fate of Iraq’s WMDs. They had them once, remember?

Mr Gaubatz verbally told the Iraq Study Group (ISG) of his findings, and asked them to come with heavy equipment to breach the concrete of the bunkers and uncover their sealed contents. But to his consternation, the ISG told him they didn’t have the manpower or equipment to do it and that it would be ‘unsafe’ to try.

‘The problem was that the ISG were concentrating their efforts in looking for WMD in northern Iraq and this was in the south,’ says Mr Gaubatz. ‘They were just swept up by reports of WMD in so many different locations. But we told them that if they didn’t excavate these sites, others would….

Politics, as usual!

So we know that it’s the policy of the federal government to disavow any knowledge of these 4 bunkers. The Democrats in Congress have been asked to investigate by John Loftus, the organizer of the Intelligence Summit, but they’re not touching this with a 10-foot pole. Why? I’ll leave you with the money quote from Phillips:

The Republicans won’t touch this because it would reveal the incompetence of the Bush administration in failing to neutralise the danger of Iraqi WMD. The Democrats won’t touch it because it would show President Bush was right to invade Iraq in the first place. It is an axis of embarrassment.

Amen.

If you’ve stuck with me this week, first of all, thank you! While it really wasn’t hard for me to write all of my commentary on the Iraq Study Group Report (4-6 hours altogether), I imagine that it may have been difficult to read it every day for the past five days if the Iraq war is not on your personal radar screen. I also really appreciate the fact that many of you saw my running commentary and linked to it.

Now that it’s all over, so to speak, I feel that I owe you some sort of final word on the subject. To be honest, I skimmed the rest of the report. I only wanted to gauge the overall value of this report outside the mainstream media. I couldn’t resist bringing the 79 recommendations to your attention when I saw how weak they are in comparison to the media hype surrounding them.

I don’t believe that there is a single piece of information in this report that the president hasn’t already heard. In fact, there are probably dozens of reports just like this one that cross his desk each morning. I’ll even go so far as to say that there probably isn’t a single piece of information in this report that you haven’t already heard, if you bother to turn on a TV, read the paper, visit a blog, or listen to talk radio.

Within the report you can find pretty much any spin you like. There are pieces that say we’re on the right track and there are pieces that say we’re doomed. On the whole, I would say it leans toward changing strategy, but definitely not toward complete withdrawal.

You may ask: since this report is essentially useless to the White house, why did anyone bother writing it?

There are several answers:

Politics – Some of those involved had an axe to grind. They wanted to make a statement about the war. You can see there influence through the careful placement of key buzz words.

Public pressure - The American people want to see the government doing something, even if it is pointless.

Ego – Certainly, some members of the ISG just wanted to feel as though they were contributing something to the war effort.

Bureaucracy – Sadly, nothing is official in government until thousands of trees die and millions of little green pieces of paper change hands.

From the ISG report, page 95:

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.

Once again, it’s important to note that Iraq is NOT part of the global war on terror.

From the ISG report, page 93:

RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.

Perhaps if they weren’t constantly being told that Iraq is a quagmire, military failure, or disaster area, more civilians might consider joining the rebuilding effort.

From the ISG report, page 87:

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.

We’ve already begged other countries to help us out. We are NOT about to perform sexual favors to change their minds.

From the ISG report, page 87:

RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.

Translation: we’ve decided to make the president the whipping boy for Iraq. Since we’ve turned this into an unpopular war, yet our national security depends on it we have no choice but to make it appear as though congress is merely acting to bail the president out.

Recommendations 62 & 63 deal with Iraq’s oil. This is a selected subset of the items presented.

From the ISG Report, page 84:

Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.

And allow them to double-bill?

To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.

For a mere $10 million per year, I’ll take charge of IraqOilBlog.com.

The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.

For all of the above, one might consider enlisting the help of the New Jersey branch of Teamsters Union. Of course, they’ll want their cut of the profits.

From the ISG report, page 83:

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice.

Wait, wait, wait. Which branch of our bloated government are we using to teach the Iraqis about anti-corruption practices?

From the ISG report, page 83:

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.

Or, the Iraqis could figure out how they want to run their own government while we politely watch their backs.

From the ISG report, page 82:

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.

This sounds like an excellent use of government resources, as opposed to something like funding ugly public art projects or drafting pointless reports.